The Artillery Fight at the First Battle of Bull Run

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Captain John D. Imboden
Commander, Staunton (Virginia)

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Artillery, when used properly, often brings success in battle. In the first major battle of the American Civil War, the Battle of Bull Run (also referred to as Manassas), the Federals misused their artillery, disregarding their range advantage, while the Confederates employed sound artillery tactics. Had the Federals used their artillery properly, the Civil War very likely could have been over before it really got started. This battle teaches today's soldiers a lot about the proper use of artillery: to maintain unity of command, take advantage of the capabilities of the weapons, achieve mass and synchronize fires and maneuver.

The Civil War took the US military establishment by surprise, especially its artillery. In 1860, the year before the fratricidal conflict, the country was at peace and had no foreseeable enemy. The only threat, if any, came from noncompliant Indian tribes in the western territories who were being policed by disparate regular army cavalry and infantry formations. And as for regular army artillery units, they were deployed mostly along the periphery of the United States as coastal or "heavy" artillery units. These units had large-caliber weapons in fixed positions that were protected by masonry walls, for example at Fort Sumter, South Carolina, or Fort Monroe, Virginia.

As for the state militias, artillery formations were almost non-existent, especially in the northern states. Pennsylvania, for example, had only one company of artillery, the Ringgold Light Artillery of Reading. [1]

When 11 Southern states seceded from the Union in the winter and spring of 1860-61 forming the Confederate States of America, the US Army had to reconfigure itself under the most harrowing of circumstances. The battle would call for light (or "field") artillery formations to help suppress the rebellion, and
only eight companies of regular light artillery existed. The heavy artillery formations, the norm of the regular army since the War of 1812, would not do. Because of this, most of the artillery units had to convert quickly and learn the special tactics and techniques of light artillery. These included maneuvering across a battlespace, selecting a proper firing position while under fire and massing fires at the right time and place. In the pre-war heavy artillery, none of these tactics or techniques mattered as they were in fixed fortifications designed by military engineers. [2]

The general lack of knowledge about light artillery tactics and techniques is apparent when one sees how the opposing sides organized their armies for the Battle of Bull Run. Both sides simply sprinkled their artillery assets among the various infantry brigades as had been done during the Revolution when guns were less mobile. This made it very difficult to mass fires. Although Brigadier General Irvin McDowell's 35,000-man Federal "Army of Northeastern Virginia" and Brigadier General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard's 30,000-man Confederate "Army of the Potomac" each had a nominal artillery chief, the chiefs had no real tactical authority. [3]

The Federals and Confederates. The Federal General McDowell organized his 35,000 men into five divisions with two to four brigades each (a total of 11 brigades) supported by 47 cannons of various makes and calibers. The cannons were organized into 10 companies, nine from the regular army and one from the Rhode Island State Militia. They included 16 3-inch Parrot rifles, two 3.67-inch and one 4.2-inch Parrot rifles, 4 4.62-inch M1841 field guns, 8 4.62-inch field howitzers and 12 James 3-inch bronze rifles. [4]

General P.G.T. Beauregard's 30,000-man Confederate Army of the Potomac (reinforced by Brigadier General Joe Johnston's Army of the Shenandoah) consisted of 12 brigades of infantry, 40 M1841 3.67-inch field guns, nine 3-inch ordnance rifles and four 4.62-inch field howitzers (53 total) organized into 12 firing units. Unlike McDowell's army, which consisted almost entirely of regular army artillery, the Confederate artillery was drawn exclusively from the volunteer militia. [5]

One final note on the ordnance of the opposing armies. While 51 percent of the Federals' guns were rifled, only 18 percent of the Confederates' were rifled. Although they only shot 3-inch bolts, rifled cannons had a stand-off range of 500 to 1,500 yards against comparable smooth bores, depending on the piece. The Parrot rifles had an effective range of 2,500 yards if a target could be seen through the haze of battle; the 3-inch ordnance and James rifles had a range of 2,000 yards; and the 4.62-inch field howitzers and the M1857-Napoleon field guns had a range of 1,500 yards while the Mexican War-era Ml 841 field guns could reach out only to 1,000 yards. Although the Federals were slightly outnumbered in pieces on the field, if they maximized the range of their
superior rifles appropriately, they easily should have been able to strip the Confederates of their artillery assets and control the battlespace. However, if the Federals moved to within easy range of the enemy's smooth bores, the rifles would be destroyed by the larger caliber pieces. As long as the Federals fired at a stand-off range as our M-1 tanks did during the Gulf War, their victory would be assured. [6]

The First Battle of Bull Run. On July 18, McDowell conducted his famous feint against Beauregard's right at Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords, just north of Manassas Junction along Bull Run Creek. Once the Federals determined that the Louisiana Creole had weakened his left to shore up his right, McDowell began to shift the bulk of his army to the north and west and attacked Beauregard's left soon after dawn on Sunday, 21 July 1861. [7]

While Colonel Israel Richardson's division was kept at Blackburn's and Mitchell's fords to fix the Confederates there, three divisions conducted an en echelon attack across Bull Run Creek. McDowell's main effort, two divisions commanded by Colonels David Hunter and Samuel Heintzelman, crossed Bull Run at Sudley Ford and drove down the Manassas Road, flanking Confederate Colonel Nathan Evans' dug-in brigade that was jealously guarding the Alexandria-Warrenton Pike at a stone bridge. Once Evans was turned, Brigadier General Daniel Tyler was to force a crossing there with his division and link up with Hunter and Heintzelman; then the three divisions commanded by McDowell would drive south, dispersing the Rebel army and capturing Manassas Junction. The Federals then would continue on to Richmond to quell the "slaveholder's insurrection." [8]

The battle resumed soon after dawn on 21 July when skirmishers from Dan Tyler's division "made their appearance in line of battle, about 1,500 yards in front of [Evans'] position." [9] They soon were followed by Second Lieutenant Peter Haines' mammoth 4.67-inch Parrot rifle from Company G, 1st US Artillery, and four guns from Captain James Carlisle's Company E, 2d US Artillery, which "commenced firing at intervals at different directions [in an effort to make] Evans show his position, which was still concealed." [10]

After three hours of firing and after being informed that an even larger Federal column was marching down the Sudley-Manassas Road, Evans deduced that the Federal attack to his front was merely a ruse de guerre. He boldly decided to "quit his position and meet the enemy in his flank movement." [11]

Evans informed Beauregard of his intentions and left only four companies from the 4th South Carolina and one platoon of brown-clad "Tiger Zouaves" from the 1st Louisiana Special Battalion to hold the stone bridge. He then ordered the rest of his brigade--10 and one-half companies of infantry, one troop of cavalry
and one section of two M1841 4.62-inch howitzers from the Lynchburg (Virginia) Artillery, about 900 men total--toward the Sudley Road to try to stop or at least slow the advancing Federal column. [12]

Evans led his command to the foot of a low-lying ridge called "Matthews Hill." He ordered his battalions to advance up the hill while he placed his artillery atop Buck Hill, about 200 yards to the rear, near Warrenton Pike. As Shanks' infantry marched up the slope, however, Colonel Ambrose Burnside's brigade, the lead element of McDowell's column, approached the hill from the north. A fight for its crest ensued. [13]

As the battle progressed, Burnside's 1st and 2d Rhode Island regiments drove Evans' men back down the hill and into a low-lying thicket of pines. When the Federals continued their attack down the southern slope of Matthews Hill, Evans' two howitzers, skillfully deployed behind the infantry atop Buck Hill, fired on the Rhode Islanders in conjunction with his infantry. Private Sam English of the 2d Rhode Island remembered, "A perfect hail storm of bullets, round shot and shell was poured into us, tearing through the ranks and scattering death and confusion everywhere." The well-directed fire stunned the Rhode Islanders, and they pulled back behind the slope to await reinforcements. [14]

Colonel Hunter quickly ordered his next unit, Captain William Reynolds' company of six 3.8-inch James bronze rifles, to deploy to the right of the 1st Rhode Island--instead of placing it on the west side of the road along Dogan's Ridge where its long-range guns easily could have enfiladed Evans' line. As the Rhode Island artillerists wheeled their guns into battery, men and horses went down by the score. "It was rather nervous business for one who had never seen anything but 'muster day' encounters to find the balls flying round his head, perfectly regardless of whom they might hit," admitted one artillerist. For the next half-hour or so, the two lines of apprentice soldiers blazed away at each other at close range.

By 1045, Matthews Hill was enveloped in thick smoke and visibility was cut to 50 yards. On Evans' right, Major Roberdeau Wheat of the "Louisiana Tiger Battalion" decided to launch a counterattack to regain the crest of the hill before the Yankees garnered enough strength and gumption to renew their attack down the hill. His target was the spot in which the 1st Rhode Island and Reynolds' artillery companies were adjoined. If his Tigers could break through, they would knock the Rhode Islanders from the crest and allow the rest of Evans' line to advance. [16]

However, when the Tigers exited a cornfield and advanced within 20 yards of the Union line, the Rhode Islanders gave "the most hideous scream" and raked them with musketry. [17] The frenzied point-blank fire was enough to stop the
Louisianians and force them to retreat back down the bill and behind a pine thicket. If Wheat had launched his counterattack soon after the Rhode Islanders had crested the ridge, when Davidson's guns were "tearing through the ranks and scattering death and confusion everywhere," there's little doubt he would have been successful. [18]

While Evans and Burnside continued to hammer away at each other, Confederate Brigadier General Barnard Bee and Colonel Francis Bartow deployed parts of their brigades about 1,000 yards south of Evans' line along the northern slope of Henry Hill. They had four regiments of infantry and one company of light artillery, the latter commanded by Captain John D. Imboden. Unlike Colonel Hunter who simply ordered his Rhode Island artillery company to "go forward," Bee conducted an outstanding reconnaissance for Imboden's Staunton (Virginia) Artillery. [19]

Captain Imboden reported, "General Bee had chosen the best possible position for an artillery company on all that field. We were almost under cover by reason of a slight swell in the ground immediately in our front, and not 50 feet away. Our shot passed 6 inches above the surface of the ground on this 'swell' [his guns were in defilade], and the recoil ran the guns back to still lower ground, where as we loaded only the heads of my men were visible to the enemy....The first round or two from the enemy went high over us. Seeing this, General Bee directed us to fire low and ricochet our shot on the hard, smooth open field that sloped toward the Warrenton Turnpike in the valley between us. We did this and the effect was very destructive to the enemy." [20]

As Bee watched the desperate battle rage, he could see Evans was holding out against incredible odds. He rode down to the hard-pressed South Carolinian to urge him to fall back to Henry Hill, a stronger position. But Shanks, not recognizing Bee's authority (he was from Joe Johnston's Army of the Shenandoah, recently arrived by rail) balked and dared Bee to come down and support his men who were bravely holding their ground against the contemptible Yankees. Faced with Evans' naked but daring insubordination, Bee rode back up to Henry Hill and ordered his two regiments and one of Bartow's, the 8th Georgia, to take up a position to the left of the 4th South Carolina where Wheat's battalion was once deployed. "Here is the battle-Field," Bee cried, "and we are in for it!" [21]

Bartow and Bee were quickly matched by the Federals, however. Two more brigades arrived on Matthews Hill and Dogan's Ridge with two companies of light artillery in support: Captain John Ricketts' Company I, 1st US Artillery (six rifled guns) and Captain Charles Griffin's Company D, 5th US Artillery, the "West Point Artillery" (four rifled and two smoothbore guns). (Griffin's Company included Second Lieutenant Adelbert Ames, the first artilleryman to win the
Medal of Honor; Ames won the medal while fighting in the First Battle of Bull Run.) [22] With 18 cannons now in the fight (many of which were firing into Bee's left flank from Dogan's Ridge), the Federals began to control the battlefield; the Confederates, faced with overwhelming numbers and firepower, were forced to retreat back to Henry Hill. [23]

As Bartow's, Bee's, and Evans' shattered brigades retreated south across the pike sometime after noon, Brigadier General Thomas Jackson approached Henry Hill from the south with an odd collection of nine regiments of infantry and 13 pieces of artillery. After a quick gaze across the pike from the northeastern edge of the grassy expanse, Jackson sensed the Federal commander's intent and expertly positioned most of his forces perpendicular to the Federal line along the northern and eastern slopes of Henry Hill. Eventually, his deployment became known as "Jackson's Stone Wall." [24]

Jackson weighted the left wing, which faced west across Henry Hill and consisted of the 13 cannons and six Virginia regiments. Like Bee before him, Jackson was an artillery officer from the old army who could position his cannons masterfully. He deployed the cannons just behind the crest of the eastern edge of Henry Hill where they could fire in defilade across the 300-yard plateau and, after they recoiled down the slope, could be reloaded under complete cover.

To shore up his right, Jackson positioned three regiments near the Robinson House to face the Federals who were massing just across the pike. Because these units were deployed in an exposed position, they came under intense artillery fire from the 18 Federal guns massed along the crest of Matthews Hill and Dogan's Ridge. [25] Jackson hoped the Federals would try to flank his exposed right by attacking it from the west, thus coming smack into his main line, including his artillery forces and six regiments of infantry. And if he could garner more forces, he would place them in a belt of trees along the southern edge of Henry Hill, so the Federals would walk into a giant "z-shaped" ambush. As Jackson completed his master plan, General Beauregard arrived on the hill, took over command and helped Bartow, Bee, and Evans consolidate their shattered brigades behind Jackson's Stone Wall. [26]

While Beauregard and Jackson were busily constructing a new line atop Henry Hill, Brigadier General McDowell, the Federal commander, also arrived on the field and conferred with his principal lieutenants atop Matthews Hill. Happy with how the battle had evolved thus far, he decided to press the attack south toward Manassas Junction with two regular companies of artillery, Ricketts' and Griffin's, and five relatively fresh brigades of infantry from Hunter's, Heintzelman's and Tyler's divisions. However, in directing the attack, McDowell
curiously instructed his artillery chief, Major William Barry (2d Artillery), to order Ricketts and Griffin to move their guns from Dogan's Ridge to Henry Hill in advance of the infantry. [27]

Battles are won or lost on the turn of a singular event. At the Battle of Bull Run, this order was it. Ricketts and Griffin received Barry's orders in disbelief. They both scanned the hill where they were ordered to go. It was just behind the area in which Imboden's guns had just been driven off. Ricketts protested the order, stating the area was not only void of friendly infantry support, but also was within easy musket and canister range of the forming enemy line barely discernible through the haze. It would be better, he argued, if the long-range rifles were massed along Matthews Hill and Chinn Ridge, thus bringing converging fires onto the massing Confederates on Henry Hill. He further argued that the only advantage his 3-inch rifles had over the larger-mouthed smoothbores he faced was in their stand-off range. His guns easily could engage the Confederates at 2,000 yards while they could only return fire at 1,500 yards. [28]

After the war, Captain Imboden wrote that he concurred with Ricketts' insightful analysis. "It was at this time that McDowell committed, as I think, the fatal blunder of the day, by ordering both Ricketts' and Griffin's batteries to cease firing and move across the turnpike to the top of Henry Hill....The short time required to effect the change enabled Beauregard to arrange his new line of battle on the highest crest of the hill" [emphasis added by the author]. [29]

In retrospect, it probably would have been better if Reynolds', Griffin's, and Ricketts' artillery companies had been massed on Matthews Hill and Chinn Ridge. There their long-range guns would have had Henry Hill in a cross fire. While this occurred, Tyler's division could have attacked up the east side of Henry Hill from stone bridge, Heintzelman's could have attacked directly south across the pike, and Porter's brigade, Hunter's division, could have swung around Chinn Ridge and hit the Confederates atop Henry Hill from the west. If this had been done, the Federals would have won the battle, Richmond most likely would have fallen, and the war may have ended right then. [30]

But instead of heeding Ricketts' sensible arguments, Barry directed the two regular batteries to go forward, arguing "the general has ordered it." [31]

Disgusted, Ricketts and Griffin limbered their respective firing units and moved in advance of the infantry to the western face of Henry Hill where they deployed on both sides of the house. There not 300 yards from 13 Confederate smoothbores, their nine rifles and two smoothbores met a horrifying fusillade of shot and shell from Jackson's well-placed gun line.
Captain Imboden later remarked, "I venture the opinion, after a good deal of observation during the war, that in open ground, at 1,000 yards, a...battery of smooth guns...well handled, will in one hour discomfit double the number of the best rifles ever put in the field." [32]

In the wake of his now-outgunned artillery, McDowell dispatched his battalion of marines from Porter's brigade and the 11th New York "Fire Zouaves" and the 1st Minnesota Regiment from Heintzelman's division to support the guns and begin the assault. The infantrymen and marines deployed to the right and rear of the cannons, shielded by the western slope of Henry Hill. [33]

Fifteen minutes later, at about 1430, Heintzelman ordered the infantrymen to move farther down the road and skirt the woods on the south side of the hill to roll up Beauregard's left flank. As the Minnesotans and Fire Zouaves moved onto the plateau, they were unexpectedly hit by musketry from Colonel Arthur Cummings' 33d Virginia Regiment from Jackson's brigade. In the confusing fight that followed, the Federals broke and retreated back up Sudley Road. As they did so, two companies from Colonel James Ewell Brown "Jeb" Stuart's 1st Virginia Cavalry charged into their disorganized mass from the south, routing them and driving them farther up the road. The untried marines, seeing this conflagration developing to their right and rear, bolted as well, leaving Ricketts and Griffin unsupported. [34]

At this juncture, Second Lieutenant Charles Hazlett, one of Griffin's platoon leaders, suggested the exposed battery be withdrawn to Chinn Ridge, about 500 yards to the west. From there, the guns would not only be farther from the dangerous Confederate smoothbores, but also safe from an infantry counterattack. Although Griffin agreed with Hazlett in theory, he refused to withdraw. No matter how unsound, his orders were clear. He decided to maneuver his section of field guns to the place where the Fire Zouaves and the Minnesotans were driven off to enfilade the Confederate cannons that were wreaking havoc on his battery. Unlimbering atop a small knoll 150 yards from the Rebels, Griffin fired two salvos of solid shot into the Confederate gun line.

A few minutes later, Griffin noticed through the thick gray smoke a line of "dust-covered" infantry about 200 yards away heading toward his right rear. Correctly thinking the infantrymen were Confederates, the old regular promptly ordered his guns to swing to the right and switch to canister. At that time, Major Barry rode up to inform him the men below were advancing Federals from Heintzelman's division. Barry, therefore, ordered Griffin to change back to solid shot and continue his well-placed enfilade fire against the Rebel guns.
Again Griffin protested Barry's orders. "They are Confederates," Griffin argued, "as certain as the world, they are Confederates." Barry answered, "No Captain, they are your battery support!" [35]

After a few more tense moments, the unidentified infantry column moved to within 70 yards of Griffin's guns, fired a volley into the Federal artillerists and then charged up the slope. The attacking infantry were from the 33d Virginia and quickly overran the Federal cannons.

When the surviving members of the doomed platoon retreated back to the Henry House, Griffin asked Barry, "Do you think that was our support?" The artillery chief answered, "I was mistaken." "Yes," Griffin said, "you were mistaken all around." [36]

Soon after Griffin's smoothbores were captured, Colonel Alfred Wood's 14th New York State Militia Regiment, the "Red-Legged Devils" from Hunter's division, charged up from the Sudley-Manassas Road and slammed into the 33d Virginia's left, driving it back into the woods and retaking Griffin's cannons. The emboldened New Yorkers continued forward, intent on taking Beauregard's gun line in flank. As the New Yorkers advanced north across the front of the Confederate-held woods, Jackson's 4th and 27th Virginia regiments ripped several volleys into their right, charged them and force them to retreat behind Ricketts' battery. Again, Griffin's and Ricketts' guns were left unsupported. [37]

Beauregard seized this rare opportunity and ordered his entire line to advance at 1500 to drive the Federals from the hilltop. Elements from the 2d, 4th, 27th and 33d Virginia regiments from Jackson's brigade swept across the field toward Ricketts' battery. Simultaneously, the 49th Virginia, joined by the 2d Mississippi and the blue-clad 6th North Carolina Regiment, recaptured Griffin's field guns. After a brief fight the Confederates charged gallantly--all eight Federal pieces either fell to or were driven off by Beauregard's attacking infantry. [38]

In one fell swoop, McDowell lost his artillery assets. This dramatic back-and-forth fighting across Henry Hill was caused in great measure by the misuse of artillery. If Barry had heeded Ricketts' advice and deployed his assets on Matthews Hill and Chinn Ridge, the Confederates could not have retained Henry Hill. Instead, the two sides were embroiled in a costly but indecisive fight.
As for the Confederates, once McDowell made the mistake of sending Griffin's and Ricketts' batteries into Jackson's apportioned kill zone, Beauregard should have ordered at least some of his guns to move around the eastern face of Henry Hill and set up on Bald Hill. From that position, the Rebel gunners easily could have enfiladed the Federals with solid shot and unhinged their entire line. At about 1600, Brigadier General Milledge Bonham's and Colonels Arnold Elzey's and Jubal Early's brigades arrived, after marching up the Manassas Road. They deployed atop Bald Hill and slammed into McDowell's right. Included in this force was First Lieutenant Robert Beckham's Culpeper (Virginia) Artillery that went into battery on the far left of the Confederates along Chinn Ridge. These forces tipped the scales against the Federals who were blocked on two sides by advancing Confederate infantry and well-placed Confederate artillery. Beckham's battery fired enfilading solid shot down the pressed Federal line and drove McDowell's forces from Henry Hill and, ultimately, from the field of battle. [39]

Lessons Learned. The use of artillery at the First Battle of Bull Run is highly instructive for modern-day Redlegs.

Mass and synchronization on the battlefield achieve decisive results. When mass and synchronization were achieved at Bull Run, decisive results followed. Good examples are when the Federals drove Bartow, Bee and Evans from Matthews Hill and when Jackson was able to stop the Federal attack on Henry Hill.

Some examples illustrating the results when a force did not achieve mass and synchronize fires and maneuver are when Evans failed to follow up his repulse of Burnside on Matthews Hill and when McDowell committed the fatal blunder of the day in moving Ricketts and Griffin to Henry Hill. Correct artillery tactics called for several batteries to be concentrated on key terrain features to engage high-payoff targets, such as artillery units or approaching infantry columns.

We must understand and take advantage of the capabilities of our weapons systems. Barry should have placed his rifles on Matthews Hill and Chinn Ridge where their longer range would have been more effective. From these places, the Confederates on Henry Hill would have been caught in a cross fire and suppressed, easily enabling McDowell's infantry brigades to collapse Jackson's Stone Wall.

If artillery fires are properly applied and synchronized with maneuver, the force will control the battlespace--perhaps the most important lesson of the battle. As such, we must clearly define our essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) and essential FA tasks (EFATs). If McDowell and Barry had developed clear "EFSTs" (e.g., suppress enemy units on Henry Hill) and if Barry had executed
the related "EFATs" competently (e.g., placing batteries on Matthews Hill and Dogan's and Chinn Ridges), then there would neither have been a fatal blunder nor a Stone Wall. The lessons at Bull Run again show that artillery can be the preeminent battle system—the King of Battle. If we squander our assets, if we fail to understand the tactics of artillery and are unable to integrate and synchronize these battle winning assets with maneuver, we will lose. Given advances in technology, our artillery officers must be prepared to make the most of their artillery in the next war, or we will squander opportunities we could gain by artillery fires.

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Endnotes:

(1.) Samuel Bates, History of the Pennsylvania Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion (Harrisburg, PA: 1885], 15g. The Ringgold Light Artillery of Reading was named after Major General Zachary Taylor's intrepid artillery chief Major Samuel Ringgold, who was killed at the battle of Palo Alto in 1846.

(2.) L. Van Loan Naisawald, Grape and Canister: The Story of the Field Artillery of the Army of the Potomac 1861-65 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. 1999), 23,448. The eight light artillery companies were K and 1, 1st US; A and M, 2d US; C and B, 3d US; and Band G, 4th US. Of these, tour served under General McDowell at Bull Run; Captain John Ricketta Company l, let US, was the most senior.

During the summer of 1661, the Confederates had two armies deployed across northern Virginia: Brigadier General Johnston's 9,400-man Army of the Shenandoah headquartered in Winchester and Brigadier General P.G.T. Beauregard's 23,000-man Army of the Potomac headquartered at Manassas. Johnston's army reinforced Beauregard's army, bringing the total on the field at the First Battle of Bull Run up to 30,000. Although Johnston was senior in rank at Bull Run, he allowed Beauregard to command the left wing that did most of the fighting on 21 July.


7. War Department Official Records 2:186-87,305; Fry, Battles and Leaders, 1:179-83, 203; and McDonald, 10.


(14.) Hennessy, 51; War Department Official Records, 2:396-400, 559-61; and Rhodes, 26.

(15.) Hennessy, 51; and War Department Official Records, 2:346, 395.

(16.) War Department Official Records, 2:305, 398-400, 559-61; and Wheat, 2:194.

(17.) Rhodes, 26.

(18.) Beauregard, Battles and Leaders, 1:207; War Department Official Records, 2:305, 559-61; Providence Evening Press, 13 July 1861; and Rhodes, 26.

(19.) Hennessy, 66-67; and John Imboden, "Incidents of the First Bull Run," Battles and Leaders, 1:234.

(20.) Ibid.

(21.) Fry. Battles and Leaders, 1:185; Beauregard, Battles and Leaders, 1:210; Imboden, Battles and Leaders, 1:234; and War Department Official Records, 2:515-16, 552, 559, 566-67. The 7th Georgia remained on Henry Hill and, with Hampton's Legion, later covered the retreat of Bartow, Bee and Evans from Matthews Hill around the Robinson House.


(23.) Fry, Battles and Leaders, 1:185; Beauregard, Battles and Leaders, 1:210; Imboden, Battles and Leaders, 1:234; and War Department Official Records, 2:515-16, 552, 559, 566-67. The West Point Artillery is the Army's oldest regular unit.

(24.) Beauregard, Battles and Leaders, 1:210; McDonald, 76-78; and War Department Official Records 2:559-61. A West Point graduate and Mexican War veteran, Thomas Jackson was the artillery instructor at the Virginia Military Institute when his state seceded from the Union. His 1st Brigade. Army of the Shenandoah, consisted of the 2d, 4th, 5th, 7th, 27th and 33d Virginia regiments. He absorbed Hampton's Legion and the 8th and 49th Virginia regiments, Army of the Potomac, when he reached Henry Hill. His guns were from the Rockbridge and Governor Wise [Virginia] batteries, Army of the Shenandoah, and five guns from the Washington Artillery of New Orleans, Army of the Potomac. After the battle, "Stonewall" Jackson was promoted to major general and given command of the Valley District, Department of Northern Virginia.
Before the war, most of the uniformed militia units, North or South, were outfitted in gray. Some companies, like at least two from the 33d Virginia, however, wore dark blue frock coats to match the regulars. At the Battle of Bull Run, not only were both sides in blue and gray, but several regiments had companies with different uniforms (e.g., 1st Louisiana Special Battalion, 33d Virginia and 69th New York).

Griffin was later promoted to major general and commanded a division of infantry in the Army of the Potomac.

During this melee, Captain Ricketts was wounded and captured. Released five months later, he was promoted to brigadier general and commanded a division of infantry in the Armies of the Rappahannock and Virginia that were commanded by Generals McDowell and Pope, respectively.

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